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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent,: Case No. 860041 
v. : 
RICHARD S. JOHNSON, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from a conviction of first degree murder 
after a trial in the Second District Court. This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-
2(3) (h) (1987). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court err in admitting evidence of a 
criminal conspiracy relating to the distribution of cocaine? 
2. Did the trial court err in not granting defendant's 
motion to dismiss the aggravating factor of pecuniary gain? 
3. Should the trial court have given defendant's 
requested jury instruction on reasonable doubt? 
4. Did the trial court err in giving the state's 
requested jury instruction on the lesser included offense of 
second degree murder? 
5. Did the state present sufficient evidence to 
convict defendant of first degree murder? 
6. Did the prosecutor misstate evidence in his closing 
argument such that defendant was prejudiced? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES 
Rule 801, Utah R. of Evid. provides: 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A 
statement is not hearsay if: 
• • • • 
(2) Admission by party-opponent. the 
statement is offered against a party and is 
• • • (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a 
party during the course and in furtherance of 
the conspiracy. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Richard S. Johnson, was charged by 
information with one count of first degree murder, a capital 
felony, under Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-202 (Supp. 1987) (R. 1). 
After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty as charged (R. 
193). Once a penalty hearing had been completed, Judge Roth 
sentenced defendant to life in prison (R. 134). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In November, 1985 the defendant, Randy Johnson, Brook 
Evertson, and Scott Taren met to discuss the formation of a 
cocaine distribution business (R. 437, 440). The victim, Piti 
Srisi-Ad would pick up the cocaine, the defendant and Randy would 
distribute it and Brook would put up the money (R. 441). Randy 
distributed cocaine to David Wardrop until approximately 
December, 1985 (R. 401). Between December, 1985 and May, 1986 
Randy distributed cocaine to John Montoya who distributed it to 
David among other people (R. 352)• 
During this time period defendant was also interested 
in opening a body shop wherein Piti would be working with 
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defendant painting cars (R. 277) . Defendant took out a life 
insurance policy on Piti in the amount of $100,000 and in 
January, 1986 changed the amount to $200,000 (R. 279)• Defendant 
purchased the policy to protect defendant's interest in the drug 
business and his body shop. 
In February, 1986 defendant started to have problems 
with Piti. Piti refused to distribute cocaine to defendant (R. 
403); defendant thought Piti was a "narc" (R. 468, 484, 589); and 
defendant claimed that Piti owed him money (R. 356, 444, 483, 
520). As a result of these problems and the large amount of life 
insurance defendant had on Piti, defendant attempted to hire Brad 
Bromage and Lloyd Averett to kill Piti (R. 522, 575). Defendant 
offered Bromage $10,000, a quarter pound of cocaine, and a job 
with defendant's business if Bromage would kill Piti (R. 522). 
Defendant offered to pay Averett $6000, a quarter pound of 
cocaine, and a corvette if he killed Piti (R. 576). 
When it became clear that Averett and Bromage would not 
kill Piti, defendant offered Jim Smith $3,000, a quarter pound of 
cocaine, a new house, a customized corvette worth approximately 
$45,000, and part of defendant's business to kill Piti (R. 731, 
785). Defendant also told Smith that if he did not kill Piti 
that Smith and his family would be killed (R. 637). 
Additionally, defendant stated that he wanted Piti killed by May 
16, 1987 (R. 641). 
On the night of May 15, 1986, Piti and approximately 
five other people were at Kevin Wakely's house in Ogden, Utah 
smoking marijuana (R. 646) • Piti indicated that he knew where he 
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could purchase an ounce of cocaine and Jim Smith stated that he 
also knew where cocaine could be purchased (R. 647). Smith used 
this information as a ploy to get Piti into Smith's car (R. 647). 
At approximately 4:00 a.m. on May 16, 1986 Piti and 
Smith left Wakely's house to make the purchase (R. 648). Smith 
stopped at a stop sign and when Piti looked away from Smith, 
Smith shot Piti in the head instantly killing him (648). Smith 
subsequently dropped Piti's body on Larson Lane in Ogden (R. 245, 
649) . 
Smith was subsequently arrested for the murder of Piti 
(R. 655). Initially, Smith told the officers that Brad Bromage 
and Lloyd Averett were responsible for the murder and that Smith 
was merely a passenger in the car (R. 656). After consulting 
with his attorney, Smith stated that defendant had hired Smith to 
kill Piti (R. 656) • 
At trial, the jury found defendant guilty of one count 
of capital murder. After a penalty hearing, the judge returned a 
life sentence. Other pertinent facts are found in the argument 
portion of this brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not err in admitting evidence of a 
criminal conspiracy. The majority of the testimony pertaining to 
the conspiracy was based upon observations of the witnesses and 
statements made by defendant and thus was not true hearsay. 
Additionally, the evidence was relevant to prove defendant's 
motive in wanting the victim killed. 
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It was not reversible error for the trial court to deny 
defendants motion to dismiss the aggravating circumstance of 
pecuniary gain on the ground that an accomplice instruction was 
not given. Arguably, an accomplice instruction to the jury was 
not necessary since § 76-5-202 does not require by definition 
that defendant actually pull the trigger causing the death of the 
victim. In any event, since the jury found by special verdict 
that defendant was also guilty of another aggravating 
circumstance not challenged by defendant, this Court need not 
address the pecuniary gain circumstance. 
No error occurred when the lower court refused to give 
defendant's requested instruction on reasonable doubt. The 
instructions given accurately stated the law and did not deny 
defendant due process. 
Because all of the various degrees of homicide have the 
relationship of greater and lesser offenses, the lower court did 
not err when it gave the state's requested instruction on second 
degree murder. 
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, 
sufficient evidence was presented to show that defendant hired 
James Smith to kill the victim. 
No prosecutorial error warranting reversal. First, it 
is not clear that the prosecutor misstated evidence presented at 
trial* Assuming arguendo that the prosecutor did misstate the 
evidence the jury was instructed that his closing argument was 
not evidence in the case. Additionally, there is no indication 
that the jury was so prejudiced that there would have been a more 
favorable result absent the misstatement. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING 
TESTIMONY OF A CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY. 
Defendant claims the lower court erred in admitting 
evidence of a criminal conspiracy to sell drugs involving 
defendant, the victim, and other participants pursuant to Utah R. 
Evid. 801(d)(2)(e) (1987). First, defendant complains the state 
failed to introduce independent evidence of a criminal conspiracy 
and thus under State v. Gray. 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 1986) the 
testimony of a conspiracy was inadmissible. Second, defendant 
claims that the evidence was not relevant. 
It is well established that this Court should not 
"disturb the ruling of the trial court on questions of 
admissibility of evidence unless it clearly appears that the 
lower court was in error." State v. Galleqos, 712 P.2d 207, 208-
209 (Utah 1985) (citations omitted). This Court has stated that 
"[t]he trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence will 
not be reversed absent a showing that the trial court so abused 
its discretion as to create a likelihood that injustice 
resulted." State v. Royball. 710 P.2d 168, 169 (Utah 1985). 
This Court has stated that: 
To utilize the exception, [Utah R. Evid. 
801(d)(2)(E)] the State must introduce 
evidence independent and exclusive of the 
conspirator's hearsay statements themselves, 
showing the existence of a criminal joint 
venture and the defendant's participation 
therein. Independent evidence of the 
declarant's membership in the criminal 
venture is also required. 'Otherwise, 
hearsay would lift itself by its own 
bootstraps to the level of competent 
evidence'• 
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State v. Gray. 717 P.2d 1313f 1318 (Utah 1986) (citations 
omitted). 
However, this exception is applicable only to out-of-
court statements by a co-conspirator, and not to the recounting 
of observations of a co-conspirator. As this Court stated in 
Gray, "the circumstances surrounding these transactions was 
clearly a recounting of what Imani herself had observed and not 
what she had heard." !£. at 1316. 
In this case, many of the witnesses testified to their 
own observations and to defendants statements regarding a drug 
conspiracy. John Montoya testified that he received deliveries 
of cocaine from the group composed of "Pete, Rick, Randy, and 
Scott," and that the group was involved in the distribution of 
cocaine (R. 351-53). Scott Taren testified to a meeting he 
observed and participated in wherein Rick Johnson and Randy 
Johnson would distribute cocaine, Brook Evertson would put up the 
money, and Scott would keep the books (R. 437-441). Randy 
Johnson testified he and the victim persuaded defendant to give 
them money to start a drug business, and that defendant did give 
Randy $5,000 to buy cocaine (R. 925-26). All of this testimony 
was not composed of hearsay statements by coconspirators but 
instead detailed statements made by defendant and observations of 
the witnesses. Finally, defendant admitted being involved in a 
conspiracy to sell cocaine (R. 467, 1223-24). Thus, it is 
difficult to s4e how he can claim error. 
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Second, defendant contends that the hearsay evidence as 
to the conspiracy was irrelevant. In this case, the victim had 
the drug connection for the conspiracy; defendant and other 
participants in the conspiracy would give money to the victim 
with the expectation that he would purchase the cocaine (R. 376, 
443). As a result of the cocaine business, the victim owed 
defendant money which the victim never spent on cocaine (R. 356, 
483, 520, 1385). Defendant was also concerned that the victim 
was terminating his supply of cocaine to the defendant (R. 403)• 
Additionally, defendant indicated that he thought the victim was 
a "narc" (R. 484, 589) and therefore, he could ruin the cocaine 
business. Finally, defendant attempted to get all participants 
involved in the cocaine business to obtain life insurance 
policies (R. 1195), and defendant paid the premiums on the 
victim's insurance policy (R. 1207). It is clear from the 
evidence offered to establish a conspiracy that the victim's drug 
contact and involvement in the cocaine business was relevant in 
establishing defendant's motive for having the victim killed. 
The evidence establishing a conspiracy laid the ground work for 
why defendant hired Smith to kill Piti and what defendant had to 
gain by the death. 
Even assuming the offered evidence was improperly 
admitted because it was inadmissible hearsay and irrelevant, 
defendant has failed to prove any prejudice. Utah R. Evid. 103 
(1986) provides in part that "error may not be predicated upon a 
ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial 
right of the party is affected . . . ." Error is reversible only 
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if a review of the record persuades the court that without the 
error there was "a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
result for the defendant." State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1048 
(Utah 1984)(citations omitted). Because defendant admitted being 
involved in the cocaine business and sufficient evidence was 
introduced to prove that he hired Smith to murder Piti any error 
was harmless and would not have resulted in a different verdict. 
POINT II 
NO ERROR OCCURRED IN THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FAILURE TO DISMISS THE AGGRAVATING 
CIRCUMSTANCE CHARGED UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. 
S 76-5-202(f). 
Defendant was charged with first degree murder as 
follows: 
Said defendant intentionally or knowingly 
caused the death of Piti Srisa-Ad under the 
following circumstances: 
(a) The defendant committed, or engaged or 
employed another person to commit the 
homicide pursuant to an agreement or contract 
for remuneration or the promise of 
remuneration for commission of the homicide. 
(b) The homicide was committed for 
pecuniary or other personal gain. 
(R. 1). 
At trial, defendant moved to dismiss the aggravating 
circumstance that the homicide was committed for pecuniary or 
other personal gain. The following exchange took place: 
MR. PERKINS: Yes, your Honor. If 
the Court please, Mr. Johnson is charged 
under two different sections, statutes, under 
76-5-202. They have, according to the 
Information, they have under category A, the 
defendant committed or engaged or employed 
another person to commit the homicide 
pursuant to an agreement or contract for 
remuneration or the promise of remuneration 
for commission of the homicide. 
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Then they have a second one. They 
have the homicide was committed for pecuniary 
or other personal gain. 
Now as a prerequisite, both of them, 
said Defendant intentionally or knowingly 
caused the death of Piti Srisi-Ad under the 
following circumstances. At this point in 
time, under the second predicate, B, that I 
have made reference to, there is anything but 
a showing that Mr. Johnson did anything to 
intentionally or knowingly cause the death of 
Piti Srisi-Ad with a homicide being committed 
for pecuniary or personal gain. That is a 
causal relationship that he intentionally or 
knowingly caused. The evidence is contrary 
to Rick Johnson having intentionally or 
knowingly caused the death for the pecuniary 
or personal gain from Rick Johnson. 
Therefore, I think to carry forward with sub-
section B, is inappropriate. That particular 
provision should be stricken. 
That the only remaining issue would 
be that under issue A regarding whether or 
not it was basically a contract for hire. I 
think that's the only issue that fits into 
the knowingly and intentionally. And 
therefore we move to dismiss paren B from the 
Information. 
THE COURT: Motion is denied. The 
evidence at this point would support a 
finding that the defendant hired somebody to 
cause the death of the victim for pecuniary 
gain, being to collect the insurance. 
(R. 825-26). 
Defendant now claims on appeal that since he did not 
actually kill the victim, that he could not be found guilty of a 
homicide committed for personal gain without an accomplice 
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instruction to the jury1. 
Arguably, an accomplice instruction was unnecessary in 
this case. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1) provides that 
"Iclriminal homicide constitutes murder in the first degree if 
the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another 
under any of the following circumstances . . . •" Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-2-103 (1978) defines intentionally and knowingly as follows: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or 
willfully with respect to the nature of his 
conduct or to result of his conduct, when it 
is his conscious objective or desire to 
engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with 
respect to this conduct or to circumstances 
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of 
the nature of his conduct or the existing 
circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or 
with knowledge, with respect to a result of 
his conduct when he is aware that his conduct 
is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
Nothing in either the definition of first degree murder or 
intentionally or knowingly requires that the defendant actually 
commit the act which results in the homicide. All that is 
required is that defendant has a "conscious objective" or "is 
aware that his conduct is reasonably certain" to "cause the 
result (the homicide)." 
x
 Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-202 (1978) is the pertinent statute 
regarding criminal responsibility for the conduct of another. 
This statute provides: 
76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for 
direct commission of offense or for conduct 
of another.—Every person, acting with the 
mental state required for the commission of 
an offense who directly commits this offense, 
who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, 
or intentionally aids another person to 
engage in conduct which constitutes an 
offense shall be criminally liable as a party 
for such conduct. 
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In this case, the defendant intended to cause Piti's 
death by hiring Smith to kill Piti. Defendant's actions in 
hiring Smith was a direct cause of Piti's death. But for 
defendant's actions, Piti would not have been killed. Simply 
because defendant did not pull the trigger, defendant's hiring of 
Smith was the cause of the death and defendant is just as guilty 
as if he did pull the trigger. Under this theory, no accomplice 
instruction was necessary. 
In any event, this Court need not reach the issue of 
whether an accomplice instruction was necessary since the jury 
also found that defendant was guilty of first degree murder under 
an additional aggravating circumstance not challenged by the 
defendant. The jury specifically found that the defendant 
"engaged or employed another person to commit the homicide 
pursuant to an agreement or contract for remuneration or the 
promise of remuneration for commission of the homicide" (R. 193). 
Because of this finding by the jury, this Court may affirm the 
verdict without addressing the issue of whether an accomplice 
instruction should have been given on the pecuniary gain 
aggravating circumstance. State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, 1307 
(Utah 1986) . 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT REFUSED 
TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY 
INSTRUCTION ON REASONABLE DOUBT. 
At trial, the following instructions on reasonable 
doubt were given to the jury: 
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Instruction No. 11 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that 
degree of proof that satisfies the mind and 
convinces the understanding of those who are 
bound to act conscientiously upon it. It 
must arise from the evidence or lack of 
evidence in the case. 
Iff after an impartial consideration and 
comparison of all the evidence, you can 
honestly say that you are not satisfied of 
the defendant's guilt, you have a reasonable 
doubt; but if, after such impartial 
consideration and comparison of all the 
evidence, you can truthfully say that you 
have an abiding conviction of the defendant's 
guilt such as you would be willing to act 
upon in the more weighty and important 
matters relating to your own affairs, you 
have no reasonable doubt. 
Instruction 12 
The law does not require demonstration of 
that degree of proof which, exclusing all 
possibility of error, produces absolute 
certainty, for such degree of proof is rarely 
possible. Only that degree of proof is 
necessary which convinces the mind and 
directs and satisfies the conscience of those 
who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. 
(R. 147, 148) . 
Defendant objects to instruction #12 claiming that it 
•unfairly clarifies reasonable doubt in favor of the prosecution 
as it is slanted toward conviction and not acquittal because 
there is not a corresponding clause as to when the 'doubt' is not 
enough." (R. 1660, Br. of App. at 25). To balance instruction 
#12 defendant requested the following instruction: 
Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: 
It is not a mere possible doubt, because 
everything relating to human affairs, and 
depending on moral evidence is open to some 
possible or imaginary doubt. It is the state 
of the case which after the entire comparison 
and consideration of all of the evidence 
leaves the mind of the Jurors in that 
condition that they cannot say they feel an 
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abiding conviction to a moral certainty of 
the truth of the charge. 
(R. 1661)* The trial court refused to give defendants requested 
instruction (R. 1732). 
This Court has stated that where a requested 
instruction is deniedf no prejudicial error occurs if it appears 
that the giving of the instruction would not have affected the 
outcome of the trial. Additionally, a defendant is not entitled 
to an instruction which is repetitive of principles stated in 
other instructions given to the jury. State v. McCumber. 622 
P.2d 353, 359 (Utah 1980). "[T]here is no apparent reason to 
mandate that one, and only one, particular instruction be used by 
trial judges in conveying to the jury the meaning of that elusive 
phrase, 'proof beyond a reasonable doubt.1" State v. Eagle, 611 
P.2d 1211 (Utah 1980). 
Defendant correctly cites State v. Wilks. 25 Utah 2d 
22, 474 P.2d 733 (1970) for the following proposition: 
When instructions are given which clearly 
and positively state what must be proved 
before a conviction can be had and the jury 
told that they must acquit unless each and 
every element is established by the evidence 
and beyond a reasonable doubt, it is not 
necessary to give another instruction in 
negative form. . . . 
Id. at 735. Defendant however claims that MlKs. is 
distinguishable from the instant case because "when instruction 
Number 12 was given, there were then two instructions to the 
positive and only one to the negative now unfairly weighing 
•reasonable doubt1 to the prejudice of the defendant." (Br. of 
App. at 28) • 
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Defendant appears to be playing a numbers game with the 
court. At no time does defendant contend that either instruction 
#11 or #12 shifted the burden of proof to the defendant or that 
the language denied defendant due process. State v. Tillman, 72 
Utah Adv. Rep. 6# 20 (Dec, 22f 1987). Instead defendant contends 
that instruction #12 should have been countered with an 
instruction slanted towards defendant. 
Defendant makes no allegation that if his proposed 
instruction had been given the result of the trial would have 
been different. Additional instructions stated that the burden 
of proof was on the State and that defendant was presumed 
innocent unless the State proved all elements of the crime beyond 
a reasonable doubt (R. 136, 139). No error occurred in the 
denial of the requested instruction. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING AN 
INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY ON SECOND DEGREE 
MURDER. 
Defendant claims that under the ILakei.2 t e s t the 
elements of second degree murder were not necessarily included 
within the charged offense of first degree murder and thus the 
trial court erred in giving an instruction on second degree 
murder. The error from giving such an instruction defendant 
claims, is that the jury was prejudiced towards convicting him, 
(Br. of App. at 31). 
2
 State v. Bakerf 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983). 
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Under Bj^ kfiJLr when the prosecution requests a lesser 
included offense instruction then "both the legal elements and 
the actual evidence or inferences needed to demonstrate those 
elements roust necessarily be included within the original charged 
Offense." State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 156 (Utah 1983). "In 
other words, an instruction on the lesser offense should be given 
at the prosecution's request only if the greater offense could 
not be committed without also committing the lesser offense." 
State v. Hansen. 734 P.2d 421, 424 n. 5 (Utah 1986). 
This Court established in State v. Crick. 675 P.2d 527, 
530 (Utah 1983) that "all of the various degrees of homicide have 
the relationship of greater and lesser included offenses." This 
conclusion is based upon Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-402(3)(c) (1978) 
which provides that an offense is included when it is 
specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included 
offense. This Court concluded in Crick that Utah Code Ann. S 76-
5-201 and the succeeding sections under the heading of "criminal 
homicide" (through S 76-5-207) amount to such a designation. As 
this court stated in CJLicJt: 
Section 76-5-201 provides: 
(1) A person commits criminal homicide if 
he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or 
with criminal negligence unlawfully causes 
the death of another. 
(2) Criminal homicide is murder in the 
first and second degree, manslaughter or 
negligent homicide, or automobile homicide. 
In the succeeding sections, the Code sets out 
the statutory definitions of the various 
types of criminal homicide, each (except for 
automobile homicide) in descending order of 
seriousness. This structure—notably the 
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identification of the crime of criminal 
homicide and the specification of common 
elements in § 76-5-201, and the relationships 
inherent in the succeeding sections—fulfills 
the S 76-1-402(3)(c) requirement of specific 
(statutory) designation of a lesser included 
offense. Consequently, all of the various 
degrees of homicide have the relationship of 
greater and lesser included offenses. • . . 
i<&. at 530 (citations omitted) . 
Defendant claims that the second degree murder 
instruction was improper because if the jury found that defendant 
did not hire Smith to kill the victim, and as such was not guilty 
of first degree murder, then defendant was innocent of any 
wrongdoing (Br. of App. at 30-31) • Defendant bases his argument 
in part upon the evidence presented at trial that Smith, not 
defendant, was the one who actually killed the victim. 
Defendant's argument is without merit. 
First, it is interesting to note that while defendant 
argues that he could not be found guilty of second degree murder 
because he did not do the actual killing, defendant requested a 
lesser included instruction on manslaughter at trial (R. 1663). 
Defendant's argument in regards to the second degree murder 
instruction is equally applicable to a manslaughter instruction. 
Second, assuming the jury found that defendant did not hire Smith 
to kill the victim, the jury could still have found that 
defendant intentionally or knowingly killed the victim in that 
defendant planned and assisted in the murder. There is no 
requirement that defendant actually be present and commit the 
homicide. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (Utah 1978). 
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Based upon the above argument it is clear that the 
instruction on second degree murder was proper. However, even 
assuming the instruction was erroneously given, this Court has 
stated that "where a jury finds the defendant guilty of a greater 
offense, the giving of an erroneous instruction on a lesser 
offense is not deemed prejudicial." State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 
54, 513 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1973). 
POINT V 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED TO 
CONVICT DEFENDANT OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER. 
Defendant contends that the evidence introduced at 
trial was insufficient to convict him of the charged offense. He 
alleges that the only evidence presented at trial linking him 
with the murder was that of three known drug dealers who had as 
much motive for murdering the victim as defendant had. 
This Court has stated: 
[W]e Review the evidence and all inferences 
which may reasonably be drawn from it in the 
light most favorable to the verdict of the 
jury. We reverse a jury conviction for 
insufficient evidence only when the evidence, 
so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crime of which he 
was convicted. 
State v. Marcum, 74 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 7 (Jan. 21, 1988) 
(citations omitted)• Additionally, any inconsistencies in 
testimony does not warrant disturbing the jury's verdict, and go 
merely to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the 
witnesses. Id.* at 7. 
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There was sufficient evidence introduced at trial to 
convict the defendant. Defendant argues that the testimony of 
Brad Broraage, Lloyd Averrett and Jim Smith is uncorroborated and 
illogical. Lloyd Averrett testified that defendant came to 
Averett's house and threatened him and his family (R. 606). 
Debra Averrett also testified to defendant threatening her 
husband and family (R. 610). Defendant admits going to Lloyd's 
home in Clarkston (R. 1140). Jim Smith's testimony that 
defendant was threatening him is corroborated by his wife's 
testimony (R. 637). Paulette Smith testified that Jim stated he 
did not want to kill Piti (R. 1458). She also testified that 
defendant was frequently at their house before the murder (R. 
1457) . 
It was apparently common knowledge that defendant had a 
falling out with Piti (R. 445). Both Scott Taren and Valerie 
Clark testified that defendant was angry with Piti about drugs 
(R. 445, 907). Piti owed defendant money in connection with the 
drug conspiracy (R. 483). Defendant was capable of killing Piti; 
and admited to threatening his own brother with a gun (R. 1235). 
He also admits to yelling at and threatening Piti (R. 1235). He 
explains it in a humorous light but admits to both acts. 
Defendant also claims that Jim Smith's testimony is 
illogical. Jim Smith first stated that Brad and Lloyd helped him 
kill Piti. The next day however Jim changed his story about the 
killing and told his attorney that defendant hired Smith to kill 
Piti (R. 716, 719, 788). Defendant also questions the 
credibility of Smith's testimony as it relates to the payment 
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Smith would receive for killing Piti. The issue of credibility 
is one for the jury. Smith could have believed that defendant 
was wealthy. Defendant drove a corvette and once asked Paulette 
Smith if she would like one (R. 1462). Sherry Vosper showed Jim 
Smith the diamond ring that defendant had given her (R. 468). 
Finally, defendant continuously referred to his connections in 
Park City as supporting him (R. 635). Jim Smith thought that the 
Park City connections were assisting in the payment for Piti's 
death (R. 793)• The evidence when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the verdict supports defendant's conviction. 
POINT VI 
NO PROSECUTORIAL ERROR OCCURRED 
WARRANTING A NEW TRIAL. 
Defendant contends that the prosecutor misstated in 
closing argument the immunity granted to Brad Bromage regarding 
the murder, and that this misstatement vested Bromage with 
greater credibility as a witness. 
Defendant admits that he failed to object to the 
alleged misstatement at trial, and absent manifest error he is 
barred from raising an argument on appeal not objected to at 
trial. Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1); State v. McCardell. 652 P.2d 942 
(Utah 1982). In State V. Tillman* 72 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 1 (Dec. 
22, 1987) this Court stated that it would consider all claims 
raised in capital cases on appeal even if no proper objection was 
made at trial. 
The State is of the view that when the sentencing body 
has not selected the death penalty this Court*s position on 
waiver in capital cases is inapplicable and the general rules 
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regarding waiver should be enforced* Although defendant moved 
for a new trial on the ground of prosecutorial misconduct, the 
objection to the misstatement was not timely and should not 
preserve defendants argument for purposes of appeal* This Court 
made the following statement in Tillman regarding "invited 
error": 
Indeed, it is the rule that if improper 
statements are made by counsel during a 
trial, it is the duty of opposing counsel to 
register a contemporaneous objection thereto 
so that the court may make a correction by 
proper instruction and, if the offense is 
sufficiently prejudicial, declare a mistrial* 
• . . Fairness requires that if defendant 
objected to the prosecutor's argument, he, 
through his attorney, should have made such 
objection known at the earliest opportunity. 
Tillman, 72 Utah Adv. Rep. at 13. Assuming this Court decides to 
address the merits of defendant's argument, the following 
analysis is provided by the State. 
The prosecutor made the following statement in closing 
argument: 
Brad Bromage, I gave immunity. I brought 
him here in the investigative subpoena. You 
heard the immunity. You have got immunity on 
the death of Piti Srisi-Ad and the drug 
dealings you have had, and now you have to 
answer my questions. A person can't take the 
Fifth Amendment and not answer when I have 
granted immunity. You can't incriminate 
yourself if I can't charge you. Brad Bromage 
could have said I did it, I am the one who 
did it. I couldn't have charged him. I have 
granted immunity. That's permanent and 
lasting. 
(R. 1879). Defendant claims that this statement was erroneous 
because Bromage was never granted immunity for the murder, but 
only for the drug transactions. It is unclear from the record 
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whether Bromage was granted immunity for the murder. The 
following exchange occurred during direct examination of Bromage* 
Q: Now you have previously been in to 
testify I think at the Preliminary 
Hearing, and one other investigative 
hearing some months ago? 
A: Yes. 
Q: At that point you were granted by myself, 
as County Attorney, immunity for your 
involvement in drug transactions prior to 
May 16th of this year? 
A: Transactional immunity. 
Q: Right, you understand that don't you? 
A: Yes, I do. 
Q: I think Don Sharp was your attorney at 
those hearings. He sat through the 
Preliminary and also the Investigative 
Hearing? 
A: Yes. 
Q: You understand the testimony that you may 
give, that gives you—or incriminates you 
in your use or selling of drugs can't be 
held against you at this point, you 
understand that? 
A: It cannot be. 
Q: Right. 
A: Okay, I understand. 
Q: I notice Mr. Sharp isn't here. Is it 
your intent to go ahead without his 
presence? 
A: Yes, it was. 
Q: Do you have any questions about the 
immunity before you go on? 
A: It is total immunity. 
Q: As far as any drug transaction, you can't 
be charged with any of those items. 
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A: I can't be charged with anything. 
Q: The things you are testifying about, 
that's true. If there are other things 
we learn about, we will charge you with 
those. 
A: I understand. 
(R. 516-17). 
In reviewing an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct, 
this Court: 
must determine if the prosecutor's remarks 
calls to the attention of the jurors matters 
they would not be justified in considering in 
reaching the verdict and, if so, whether 
there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
misconduct so prejudiced the jury that there 
would have been a more favorable result 
absent the misconduct. 
State v. Speer. No. 860112 slip op. at 5 (Jan. 26, 1988) citing 
State v, Tillman. 72 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 9 (Dec. 22, 1987). In 
determining whether a remark is prejudicial the alleged 
misconduct must be viewed in light of the totality of the trial 
and the trial court's ruling on this matter will not be 
overturned absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Speer. No. 
860112, slip op. at 5 (January 26, 1988). 
This Court has determined that in closing argument a 
party has considerable freedom. "Counsel for both sides have 
considerable latitude in their [closing] arguments to the jury; 
they have a right to discuss fully from their standpoints the 
evidence and the inferences and deductions arising therefrom." 
State V> Lafferty, No. 20740 slip op. at 25 (Jan. 11, 1988) 
citing State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 60, 513 P.2d 422, 426 
(1973) . 
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In this case no error occurred* Firstf it is not clear 
the prosecutor called attention of the jurors to matters outside 
of the record. Bromage stated on the record that he understood 
that he could not be charged with anything and the prosecutor 
confirmed that he could not be charged with anything he testified 
about, which would include the murder (R. 517). 
Even assuming that Bromage was not granted immunity for 
the murder, defendant provides no analysis that the misstatement 
so prejudiced the jury that there was a strong likelihood of a 
more favorable verdict absent the misstatement. The jurors were 
instructed that argument by the attorneys was not evidence in the 
case: 
Instruction No. 18 
Statements and arguments of counsel are 
not evidence in the case. When, however, the 
attorneys on both sides stipulate or agree as 
to the existence of a fact, the jury must, 
unless otherwise instructed, accept the 
stipulation and regard that fact as proved. 
Unless you are otherwise instructed, the 
evidence in the case always consists of the 
sworn testimony of the witnesses, regardless 
of who may have called them; and all exhibits 
received in evidence, regardless of who may 
have produced them; and all facts which may 
have been admitted or stipulated. 
Any evidence as to which an objection was 
sustained by the Court, and any evidence 
ordered stricken by the Court, must be 
entirely disregarded. 
Unless you are otherwise instructed, 
anything you may have seen or heard outside 
of the courtroom is not evidence, and must be 
entirely disregarded. 
(R. 154). 
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The prosecutorfs statement regarding credibility of 
Bromage is confusing at best* Assuming, as defendant argues, 
that Bromage was not granted immunity for the murder, the jury 
would have been aware of that fact and taken it into account when 
judging his credibility, i.e. that he was lying to cover up for 
his illegal conduct. On the other hand, assuming that Bromage 
was given immunity for the murder this fact in the minds of most 
jurors would make him a less credible witness, since he would be 
testifying only because of the grant of immunity and was likely 
saying what the prosecutor wanted to hear. In any event, the 
prosecutor's statements did not prejudice defendant such that 
there was a likelihood of a more favorable result. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments the State requests 
this Court to affirm defendants conviction. 
DATED this r£3~ day of February, 1988. 
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